CERT® Advisory CA-2000-04 Love
Letter Worm
Original release date: May 4, 2000
Last revised: May 9, 2000
Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
Systems Affected
- Systems running Microsoft Windows with
Windows Scripting Host enabled
Overview
The "Love Letter" worm is a malicious
VBScript program which spreads in a variety of
ways. As of 5:00 pm EDT(GMT-4) May 8, 2000, the
CERT Coordination Center has received reports
from more than 650 individual sites indicating
more than 500,000 individual systems are
affected. In addition, we have several reports
of sites suffering considerable network
degradation as a result of mail, file, and web
traffic generated by the "Love Letter" worm.
I. Description
You can be infected with the "Love Letter"
worm in a variety of ways, including electronic
mail, Windows file sharing, IRC, USENET news,
and possibly via webpages. Once the worm has
executed on your system, it will take the
actions described in the
Impact section.
Electronic Mail
When the worm executes, it attempts to send
copies of itself using Microsoft Outlook to all
the entries in all the address books. The mail
it sends has the following characteristics:
- An attachment named
"LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.VBS"
- A subject of "ILOVEYOU"
- The body of the message reads "kindly
check the attached LOVELETTER coming from
me."
People who receive copies of the worm via
electronic mail will most likely recognize the
sender. We encourage people to avoid executing
code, including VBScripts, received through
electronic mail regardless of the sender without
firsthand prior knowledge of the origin of the
code.
Internet Relay Chat
When the worm executes, it will attempt to
create a file named script.ini in any
directory that contains certain files associated
with the popular IRC client mIRC. The script
file will attempt to send a copy of the worm via
DCC to other people in any IRC channel joined by
the victim. We encourage people to disable
automatic reception of files via DCC in any IRC
client.
Executing Files on Shared File Systems
When the worm executes, it will search for
certain types of files and replace them with a
copy of the worm (see the
Impact section for more details). Executing
(double clicking) files modified by other
infected users will result in executing the
worm. Files modified by the worm may also be
started automatically, for example from a
startup script.
Reading USENET News
There have been reports of the worm appearing
in USENET newsgroups. The suggestions above
should be applied to users reading messages in
USENET newsgroups.
II. Impact
When the worm is executed, it takes the
following steps:
Replaces Files with Copies of the Worm
When the worm executes, it will search for
certain types of files and make changes to those
files depending on the type of file. For files
on fixed or network drives, it will take the
following steps:
- For files whose extension is vbs
or vbe it will replace those files
with a copy of itself.
- For files whose extensions are js,
jse, css, wsh, sct,
or hta, it will replace those files
with a copy of itself and change the
extension to vbs. For example, a file
named x.css will be replaced with a
file named x.vbs containing a copy of
the worm.
- For files whose extension is jpg
or jpeg, it will replace those files
with a copy of the worm and add a vbs
extension. For example, a file named
x.jpg will be replaced by a file called
x.jpg.vbs containing a copy of the
worm.
- For files whose extension is mp3
or mp2, it will create a copy of
itself in a file named with a vbs
extension in the same manner as for a jpg
file. The original file is preserved, but
its attributes are changed to hidden.
Since the modified files are overwritten by
the worm code rather than being deleted, file
recovery is difficult and may be impossible.
Users executing files that have been modified
in this step will cause the worm to begin
executing again. If these files are on a
filesystem shared over a local area network, new
users may be affected.
Creates an mIRC Script
While the worm is examining files as
described in the previous section, it may take
additional steps to create a mIRC script file.
If the file name being examined is mirc32.exe,
mlink32.exe, mirc.ini,
script.ini, or mirc.hlp, the worm
will create a file named script.ini in
the same folder. The script.ini file will
contain:
-
[script]
n0=on 1:JOIN:#:{
n1= /if ( $nick == $me ) { halt }
n2= /.dcc send $nick DIRSYSTEM\LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.HTM
n3=}
where DIRSYSTEM varies based on the platform
where the worm is executed. If the file
script.ini already exists, no changes occur.
This code defines an mIRC script so that when
a new user joins an IRC channel the infected
user has previously joined, a copy of the worm
will be sent to the new user via DCC. The
script.ini file is created only once per
folder processed by the worm.
Modifies the Internet Explorer Start Page
If the file <DIRSYSTEM>\WinFAT32.exe
does not exist, the worm sets the Internet
Explorer Start page to one of four randomly
selected URLs. These URLs all refer to a file
named WIN-BUGSFIX.exe, which presumably
contains malicious code. The worm checks for
this file in the Internet Explorer downloads
directory, and if found, the file is added to
the list of programs to run at reboot. The
Internet Explorer Start page is then reset to
"about:blank". Information about the impact of
running WIN-BUGSFIX.exe will be added to
this document as soon as it is available.
Sends Copies of Itself via Email
The worm attempts to use Microsoft Outlook to
send copies of itself to all entries in all
address books as described in the
Description section.
Modifies Other Registry Keys
In addition to other changes, the worm
updates the following registry keys:
-
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MSKernel32
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices\Win32DLL
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\WIN-BUGSFIX
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows Scripting Host\Settings\Timeout
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\Start Page
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\WAB\*
Note that when the worm is sending email, it
updates the last entry each time it sends a
message. If a large number of messages are sent,
the size of the registry may grow significantly,
possibly introducing additional problems.
III. Solution
Update Your Anti-Virus Product
It is important for users to update their
anti-virus software. Some anti-virus software
vendors have released updated information,
tools, or virus databases to help prevent and
combat this worm. A list of vendor-specific
anti-virus information can be found in
Appendix A.
Disable Windows Scripting Host
Because the worm is written in VBS, it
requires the Windows Scripting Host (WSH) to
run. Disabling WSH prevents the worm from
executing. For information about disabling WSH,
see:
-
http://www.sophos.com/support/faqs/wsh.html
This change may disable functionality the
user desires. Exercise caution when implementing
this solution.
Disable Active Scripting in Internet
Explorer
Information about disabling active scripting
in Internet Explorer can be found at:
-
http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/malicious_code_FAQ.html#steps
This change may disable functionality the
user desires. Exercise caution when implementing
this solution.
Disable Auto-DCC Reception in IRC Clients
Users of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) programs
should disable automatic reception of files
offered to them via DCC.
Filter the Worm in E-Mail
Sites can use email filtering techniques to
delete messages containing subject lines known
to contain the worm. For sites using unix, here
are some possible methods:
Sendmail
Sendmail, Inc. has published information
about blocking the worm in incoming email at:
-
http://www2.sendmail.com/loveletter
PostFix
Add the following line in
/etc/postfix/header_checks:
/^Subject: ILOVEYOU/ REJECT
The main Postfix configuration file must
contain the following line to enable the check :
- header_checks =
regexp:/etc/postfix/header_checks
Postfix must also be reloaded after this
information is added.
Exim
A generic Windows-executable content-blocking
filter has been produced for Exim. This will
block messages with attachments whose extensions
are vbs, as well as several other types
that Windows may consider executable by default.
The filter, which includes some supporting
installation documention within the filter file
itself, can be found at:
-
ftp://ftp.exim.org/pub/filter
Procmail
This procmail rule also deletes any messages
with the Subject: line containing "ILOVEYOU":
:0 D
* ^Subject:[[tab] ]+ILOVEYOU
/dev/null
Note that in all of these examples, [tab]
represents a literal tab character, and must be
replaced with a tab for them to work correctly.
It is important to note that these three
methods, as described, do not prevent the worm
from spreading if the Subject: line of the email
has changed. Administrators can use more
complicated procmail rules to block the worm
based on the body of the email, but such methods
require more processing time on mail servers,
and may not be feasible at sites with high
volumes of email traffic.
Exercise Caution When Opening Attachments
Exercise caution with attachments in email.
Users should disable auto-opening or previewing
of email attachments in their mail programs.
Users should never open attachments from an
untrusted origin, or that appear suspicious in
any way.
Appendix A. Anti-Virus Vendor Information
Aladdin Knowledge Systems
-
http://www.aks.com/home/csrt/valerts.asp
Command Software Systems, Inc.
-
http://www.command.co.uk/html/virus/love.html
-
http://www.commandcom.com/virus/love.html
Computer Associates
-
http://www.ca.com/virusinfo/virusalert.htm
F-Secure
-
http://www.f-secure.com/download-purchase/updates.html
Finjan Software, Ltd.
-
http://www.finjan.com/attack_release_detail.cfm?attack_release_id=34
McAfee / Network Associates
-
http://vil.nai.com/villib/dispVirus.asp?virus_k=98617
-
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-04/nai.dat
Proland Software
-
http://www.pspl.com/virus_info/worms/loveletter.htm
Sophos
-
http://www.sophos.com/virusinfo/analyses/vbsloveleta.html
-
http://www.sophos.com/virusinfo/analyses/trojloveleta.html
Symantec
-
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/vbs.loveletter.a.html
Trend Micro
-
http://www.antivirus.com/vinfo
Appendix B. Variants
The CERT Coordination Center has received
reports of worms that are nearly identical or
are very similar to the Love Letter worm. The
information provided above applies to these
variants except as noted below. This section is
not intended to be comprehensive, and we are
aware of reports involving additional variants
not described here.
Joke / Very Funny
This variant changes several references to
LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU in the source code to
Very Funny. This primarily results in an
email attachment name Very Funny.vbs. The
email messages sent by this variant have a
subject of "fwd: Joke", and an empty message
body.
Mothers Day
The subject of this variant is "Thanks for
your purchase!" and the body of the message
contains:
- We have proceeded to charge your credit
card for the amount of $326.92 for the
mothers day diamond special. We have
attached a detailed invoice to this email.
Please print out the attachment and keep it
in a safe place. Thanks Again and Have a
Happy Mothers Day!
This variant infects files as previously
described, with the exception of jpg and
jpeg files. Instead, this variant infects
ini and bat in a similar way.
Specifically, for files whose extension is
ini or bat, it will replace those
files with a copy of the worm and add a vbs
extension. For example, a file named x.ini
will be replaced by a file called x.ini.vbs
containing a copy of the worm.
This variant also includes different URLs for
the Internet Explorer Start Page.
The CERT Coordination Center thanks David
Slade of Lucent Technologies for help in
constructing this advisory; Christopher Lindsey
for the providing the procmail rule; and Jeff
Rife for catching an error in an earlier version
of this advisory.
The following people were involved in the
creation of this document: Jeff Carpenter, Cory
Cohen, Chad Dougherty, Ian Finlay, Kathy Fithen,
Rhonda Green, Robert Hanson, Jeff Havrilla,
Shawn Hernan, Kevin Houle, Brian King, Jed
Pickel, Joseph Pruszynski, Robin Ruefle, John
Shaffer, and Mark Zajicek
This document is
available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-04.html
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email:
cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour
hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
- CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.
CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline
08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) Monday
through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on
weekends.
Using encryption
We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive
information sent by email. Our public PGP key is
available from
If you prefer to use DES, please call the
CERT hotline for more information.
Getting security information
CERT publications and other security
information are available from our web site
* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are
registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office.
NO WARRANTY
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon
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Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis.
Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties
of any kind, either expressed or implied as to
any matter including, but not limited to,
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or
merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained
from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon
University does not make any warranty of any
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trademark, or copyright infringement.
Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship
information
Copyright 2000 Carnegie Mellon University.
Revision History
May 4, 2000: Initial release
May 5, 2000: Updates to Postfix information
May 5, 2000: Fixed an error in the statement regarding the actions
of the worm when it checks for the existance of the
<DIRSYSTEM>\WinFAT32.exe file. We incorrectly
reported that if this file exists, then the value of the IE start page
will be changed. In fact, the value of the start page is changed if
the file does not exist. Our thanks to Jeff Rife for catching
this error.
May 5, 2000: Added information on variants
May 9, 2000: Updated affected site count
May 9, 2000: Added EXIM information
May 9, 2000: Clarified mIRC script description
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